On Small Countries' Options for Trading with Regional Blocs
“Huge” market surpluses with sensitive agricultural products determine a serious gap in trade negotiations between regional blocs and small acceding or third countries of small market potential while market asymmetries are continuously expanding through the integration of new members. When bargaining is about a preferential trade agreement, negotiation strategies are most of the time expressed in terms of ‘opting in’ or ‘opting out’ while the economic reasoning behind them is in most cases protection for welfare improvement or not. At the same time, rational choices are complicated by endogenous factors that have an impact upon the choice of a particular negotiation strategy. I examine the above arguments within a two level game framework where two states contemplate the effects of protectionism to decide possible deals (quota levels) and to decide whether to cooperate or to start a trade war. The states are assumed to have conflicting interests. For reaching agreement, states value the payoffs of two aspects of the deals, in particular the effects on the bilateral trade flows and the national welfare. Once the states have reached an agreement, the win – set is further refined with the competition effects given by the increasing market size. As in Grossman and Helpman (1995), Cadot, de Melo, Olarreaga (2002), the states are dealing with the internal political pressure to enforce a particular bargaining deal. The main result of the paper is that even in the presence of a market disequilibrium the dominant strategy of the international trade negotiations is cooperation. The asymmetries in the market size are favoring trade and the reaching up of a trade agreement.
Keywords: Trade Agreements, Quotas, Asymetries
Dr. Genoveva Elena Perju
Risk Manager, Controlling Department |
Ref: S09P0258